Jon Agar
A handful of scientists first used stored-program electronic computers extensively in the 1950s. Now small computers can be found on the desks of all laboratories, laptops are carried into field research, and much research depends on access to larger, more powerful machines in dedicated facilities. Computers have attracted the attention of science studies researchers, and we can quickly list the things we now know: how 'computers' were first humans, then calculating machines used in science, and then objects with many applications; the determination of policy allocating computing resources to universities; the history of computers as part of a technological tradition; the computer as an object shaped by military demands; the computer industry as part of business history; computers as a tool of management control in the workplace; information revolutions as hype or fact; discrimination against women working within computer science; the creative interplay of gender and computing; the lessons that science studies can teach artificial intelligence and vice versa; as well as immense quantities of writing on network technologies and identity, and case studies of particular machines. 1 However, surprisingly little has been written about what scientists have used computers for (Agar, 1998) . This paper asks the question: what difference did access to computers make to the first generation of scientists to use them? While we do know something about the use of computers in particular scientific specialities, from the work of Galison on high-energy physics and de Chadarevian on X-ray crystallography and molecular biology (Galison, 1997; de Chadarevian, 2002) , we need to gain a comparative perspective across disciplines. To address that need, this paper casts the net widely, not only revisiting microphysics and X-ray crystallography, but also examining natural history and the implicit social science of government administration. It focuses on the period when computers were first introduced, since the novelty of the techniques caused scientists to reflect on the changes. The period chosen has the advantage of capturing scientists' excitement at the computer's capacity to supplement and extend their capacities 'to see'. It also has the advantage of bringing to light the important relationship between routinization of scientific work prior to computerization and the development of computerization. In particular, the relationship between punched-card mechanization and computerization is scrutinized by contrasting two cases: botanical map-making and government data processing. A disadvantage of focusing on this early period is that the computers in question are limited to mainframes. 2 However, while the computer might have radically changed in form over the last five decades, a recurring rhetoric can be heard throughout -assertions that certain developments in science would have been impossible without computers.
Impossible Without Computers?
A few blocks from where I am writing is HiPerSPACE -the HighPerformance Service for Physics, Astronomy, Chemistry and Earth sciences. At its centre are two Silicon Graphics Origin 2000 machines, one called Bentham and the other Miracle, which have provided a top-of-therange computing resource to academic scientists since 1999. When we hear that the machines have 72 processors, capable of a combined peak compute rate of 43 Gflops, a total memory of 30 Gbytes and 500 Gbytes of disk space, it is very tempting to accept statements such as the following:
High-performance computing (HPC) has enormous and growing importance for UK science and technology. Rapid advances in computer power are leading to completely new ways of doing science. Longstanding problems that were intractable by purely experimental methods are now yielding to computational attack. 3 Such statements are very common in the history of computing in science. Indeed, often the claims go further: computers have made certain scientific inquiries not just 'tractable' for the first time, but 'possible'. So, for example: the mapping of the cosmic microwave background radiation, on which is based claims about the early history of the universe, would have been impossible without computers; the completion of the Human Genome Project would have been impossible without computers; and the particle zoo of the 1960s could not have been corralled without the application of computer power. 4 As an example of just how far this claim can be generalized and stretched, take Douglas S. Robertson's Phase Change: the Computer Revolution in Science and Mathematics (2003) . data were transformed into information about the structure of organic molecules deployed techniques such as Beevers-Lipson strips, punchedcard apparatus and analogue computers.
Furthermore, computerization was usually first proposed when the existing practices and technologies were still capable of the computational task at hand, but a plausible claim could be sustained that they were straining at their limits. The question then becomes what makes the claim 'plausible'? Sustaining this claim was never straightforward, and success depended on a range of other factors. For example, if human labour was cheap then it became economically feasible to continue with manual or mechanical methods. Furthermore, the availability of computers, especially in the 1950s and 1960s, depended on contacts with providers of the scarce machines. Use of a computer might be arranged through personal contact, or in return for future trades in kind. Computerization therefore depended on one's position within labour economies, patronage ties, and moral economies of science.
Even when the resources were in place to permit computerization, one of three strategies could be chosen. First, the computer program could closely follow the existing organization of computation (and associated work). The computerization of mechanical botany, Oxford X-ray crystallography and census work are examples. Second, computerization could be used as an opportunity for reorganizing methods of computation (and associated work), even though it was still feasible to use manual or mechanical means. The computerization of British welfare state records and Cambridge X-ray crystallography are examples. Third, computerization could be used to reorganize methods of computation with new methods that, in principle or in practice, would be impossible to accomplish by manual or mechanical means. This third option is hypothetical, and has probably never been realized. My claim is that computerization has only been attempted in settings where there already existed material and theoretical computational practices and technologies, although I assess two candidate counterexamples: the introduction of Monte Carlo simulations in the 1940s and early 1950s (Galison, 1996 (Galison, , 1997 , and the development of interactive molecular graphics in the 1960s (Francoeur, 2002; Francoeur & Segal, 2004) .
Mechanization to Computerization
A study of the difference that computers make to science is necessarily concerned with computational practices before and after computerization. In order to assess claims that certain scientific tasks were 'impossible' before computers we need a detailed grasp of mechanical computing. One of the foremost computational techniques available before computers involved punched-card data processing.
Punched cards had been used in clerical calculations since Herman Hollerith first introduced his system in the US Census of Population of 1880. A punched card can be thought of as a grid, in which the information content is determined by the position on the grid and whether that position is un-punched or punched. Numerical data are easy to store. For example, a card that is 10 rows deep and 50 columns wide can represent the figure '199046', by punching the sixth row in the first column, the fourth row in the second column, the tenth row in the third column, and so on. Data punched on cards were processed using a series of specialized machines. A sorter could take a stack of cards and separate out all the cards with a particular pattern of holes (for example, if the cards followed the format above, the sorter could find all even numbers by separating out all the cards with holes punched in the second, fourth, sixth, eighth and tenth rows). A tabulator could take a stack of cards and generate a running total (for example it could add all the numbers together). A printer would produce a hard copy of the result of this calculation. By the early decades of the 20th century, firms such as Hollerith's (which became IBM) or Powers produced machines that combined all these functions -called punched-card tabulators, even when they did more than just tabulate.
Punched cards could hold more than mere data. The regularity of operating a punched-card tabulator also lent itself to the representation of instructions, in the form of holes punched into cards. By the 1930s, scientists such as Howard H. Aiken in the USA and Leslie J. Comrie in the UK had exploited this feature to control mechanical calculating machinery. In Aiken's Harvard Mark I (also known as the Automatic Sequence Controlled Calculator), for example, instructions in the form of holes in paper tape instructed the movement of data stored on punched cards and calculations performed by machine. However, more often, the human operator of the punched-card machinery would follow instructions, so that the organization of computation combined human, machine and method. In the first example, I examine how punched-card machinery was deployed in an innovative project among British botanists.
Mechanical Botany
Just as scientific projects have been declared to have been 'impossible without computers', so the viability of many earlier projects was said to depend on mechanization by punched-card technology. A 'vital factor' in the Distribution Maps Scheme, which culminated in the publication of the Atlas of the British Flora (1962), was retrospectively given by its director (from 1959), Franklyn Perring, as 'the advent of data processing equipment using punched cards', without which the scheme could not have been efficiently operated or completed on time . . . Without such equipment -and ultimately the mechanical production of the maps -it would not have been possible to handle the 1.5 million records that the scheme collected, or to transform these into the 1700 distribution maps which were published . . . only eight years later. (Perring, 1992) An examination of the Distribution Maps Scheme will illustrate important aspects of the application of mechanical data processing within science, but also illustrate the issues that arise when computerization is proposed.
The idea for a comprehensive mapping of the flora of the British Isles was circulated in the years after World War II by the DirectorGeneral of the Nature Conservancy, Captain Cyril Diver, and by an active member of the Botanical Society of the British Isles (BSBI), Job Edward Lousley (Allen, 1986: 153; Harding & Sheail, 1992) . In April 1950, Professor Roy Clapham concluded a specially convened conference on the 'Aims and Methods in the Study of the Distribution of British Plants' by outlining a vision:
the BSBI should take steps to ensure that before long we had a set of distribution maps of British flowering plants and ferns; that the maps when produced should be comprehensive and accurate; that they should be of small scale (about 1 in 10 million) so that they could be printed four on each page of a single volume; that the unit area should be the 10-kilometre grid square; that overlays should show the main climatic, edaphic and topographic features of our Islands and that certain other information about infra-specific units and historical changes should be included where possible. 6 Allen notes four advantages of the Distribution Maps Scheme to the BSBI: giving the membership a 'united purpose' and 'encouraging a much higher proportion of members to direct their efforts into patently productive scientific work', while eventually increasing membership and even revenue through sales of the Atlas (Allen, 1986: 153, 163) . With funding secured through the Nuffield Foundation (£10,000) and the Nature Conservancy (£4000, and a further £20,000 to complete the project), the Distribution Maps Scheme began in April 1954. Its headquarters was a poky but free office in the University Botanic Gardens, Cambridge. 7 The organization of the scheme can be roughly divided into data collection and processing. Data collection was helped immeasurably by the availability of two new institutions. The first was Clapham, Tutin and Warburg's Flora of the British Isles (1952) , the publication of which meant that use of a standard and comprehensive taxonomical guidebook could be enforced: one cheap enough to be affordable, and, just as important, portable in the field (Clapham et al., 1952; Allen, 1986: 153; Perring, 1992: 1) . Data collection was by professionals and amateurs: 3000 people responded to the call, 800 alone from an article in the Observer (Perring, 1992) . Of these, 1500, with a core of 250, participated (Allen, 1986) . The value of the amateur contribution easily matched the formal funding. 8 The second new institution was the Ordnance Survey's National Grid. The retriangulation of the British Isles, replacing imperial inches with metric metres, had begun in 1935 and was complete 10 years later. The publication of metric maps allowed professional botanists to ditch the older vicecounty system of botanical recording in favour of a grid of 10 × 10 km squares. 9 This entailed an immense increase in information to be gathered: there were 3651 km 2 in the British Isles, compared with 153 vice-counties.
In the collection of data from the field, botanists visited all but seven of the squares. Linking data collection and processing required the enforcement of rigor and routine in the field:
For quick recording in the field seven regional cards were produced, each carrying the 900 species most likely to be found in the region with six columns of abbreviated scientific names on each side. To the left of each name appears the code number of the species. The recorder in the field merely strikes through the name of the plant he sees and adds on the right symbols where necessary like G or P . . . He is also given the choice of marking the aggregate or the segregate . . . Species not listed in the cards are written in a space provided at the back. The field worker is also supplied with individual cards and is asked to send these with his regional card at the end of the season for records of particular interest, new county records, critical material checked by an expert, etc.
These field cards were sent to county referees for checking. 10 Many BSBI members, who made up the bulk of the field workforce, did not like this 'rigorous routine of mapping': it was repetitive, and antisocial (they preferred the group ramble, but human resources had to be spread thinly to ensure comprehensive coverage) (Allen, 1986: 157) . Allen also notes that:
[not all] the backsliders were those who had merely lost interest: a few highly expert botanists found the repetitive type of field recording simply not to their taste . . . Not for nothing, indeed, was the work quickly -and inevitably -dubbed 'square-bashing': it was essentially a drill, and it required a good deal of self-discipline to perform it accurately and persistently.
The inheritance of wartime culture is interesting here: some had picked up a taste for mass-participation information gathering from wartime schemes such as Mass-Observation, but others reacted sharply against such regimentation, and the significant epithet 'square-bashing' was applied both to ticking botanical boxes and to the boredom of National Service (cf. Macdonald, 2002) .
But the routinization of data collection was essential to mechanized data processing. Some of this data processing -pre-processing -had been achieved by the disciplined workforce in the field, by organizing data into marks on field cards. The rest was achieved through the use of punchedcard machinery. Field cards were combined into 'master cards' for each square, and these were given to the punched-card operator. She punched an average of 400 cards for each master card, each representing a recording of a particular species for that date, grid-reference and vice-county. 11 Perring recalls that the cards were '40-column punched cards printed to our design on which we can write all the essential information about a records, viz., species name, locality, habitat, county, altitude, collector, source of record, herbarium number, if any, and there is room for comments about status and taxonomic points'. 12 Historical data had been extracted from herbaria, the botanical literature and county records. All this information was punched onto cards. The 40-column card, which had a fixed capacity for information, formed a Procrustean bed. Nature was squeezed to fit. British mountains peak at 4200 feet (1280 m). However, the 40 possible positions that could be recorded suggested a range from sea level to 3900 feet (1190 m), so a digital decapitation was ordered. (Luckily, noted Perring, 'very little grows up there'. 13 ) So the information within the finished sortable stack of punched cards was a close but distorted representation of the geographical distribution of the British flora. Initially the maps would then have been drawn by hand, after using punched-card sorters to all cards for a particular species in grid-reference order. But Roy Smith, an engineer with the Powers-Samas manufacturer, adapted a tabulator to produce maps directly.
14 A map of a very common species (say 3500 dots) was produced in less than 1 hour, an average species (about 1000 dots) took 20 minutes.
The Atlas of the British Flora was published in 1962, by which time Perring, together with the punched-card machinery that had become the property of the Nature Conservancy under its funding conditions, was being moved to the applied ecology research station at Monks Wood (Perring & Walters, 1962) . The completion and warm reception of the pioneering Atlas gave Perring the opportunity to launch an even more ambitious scheme. Smaller societies than the BSBI (and the larger British Trust for Ornithology) sought collaborations to produce distribution maps of other taxa. Perring formalized this work through the establishment of the Biological Records Centre. Built around possession of punched-card map-making machinery, this was a storehouse and data-processing centre, a central point of surveillance of British wildlife. It was also a key node in parallel international schemes.
What does the case of mechanical botany tell us? Through preparation for the Distribution Maps Scheme, the practices of fieldwork and of compiling flora underwent further intense routinization, so that data were recorded comprehensively and in a format suitable for mechanical tabulation. This process went hand-in-hand with shift in balance of power away from the amateurs and the provinces back to professionals and the centre. This shift was not necessarily resented: some disliked the regimentation, but others found satisfaction in contributing. In Perring's proposal for the Biological Records Centre, he summarizes the second kind of response:
. . . experience shows that where some central organization, such as the Maps Scheme, exists the naturalists are willing, even anxious, to contribute; it gives them extra interest in their own work and makes contribution simpler; the relative failure of appeals by individual scientists for information must mainly be due to the difficulty it presents to the naturalist who must write many letters if he is to satisfy all the requests in any one season.
being 'rare' in Limerick); massively expanded recorded knowledge of common plants (which had often been overlooked in favour of the more exotic or scarce); and optimized objectivity in recording (ironing out the 'blind spot or weakness' of the individual), all of which were strongly aligned to the interests of the handful of professional botanists. 16 The limited capacities of the means of storing data necessarily meant that the representation of the distribution of British flora was simplified and distorted. Mountains were flattened. Subspecies were limited to six. By 'distorted', I am not being censorious. No relation of representation is an identity. Also, the effect is common, and can be found in computerized as well as mechanized systems. The more storage power the greater the detail that can be recorded, the finer the maps that can be drawn or the greater the number of species that could be surveyed. But the effect remains. (To trace this aspect of the history of science properly we need a much deeper knowledge of a topic that has been of peripheral interest even to historians of computing: the history of peripheral technology!) In Perring's proposal, the Biological Records Centre would not only continue to process data on the thousands of British species of vascular plants, but also on the hundreds of thousands of species of butterflies, moths, mosses, molluscs, mammals and so on. This expansion suggested computerization. But there were several obstacles. Perring's professional career had been tied to the promotion and use of punched-card technology, and it was difficult (but not impossible) to disentangle this successful attachment. He warned in 1970 that 'it was important not to allow the sophistication of machinery to blind users to the primary objectives of collecting data' (Harding & Sheail, 1992: 9) . 17 There was some pressure to continue to use an upgraded punched-card system (80 columns, to fit in with the influential demands of the ornithologists). But the most important factor was the sheer scale of data: the botanical database alone consisted of 1.5 million records. Only by 1970 was some computerization underway: the 40-column botanical punched cards were transported in batches of 300,000 to the Law Society's Computer Centre in London where they were copied on to magnetic tapes, which were then copied onto other special tapes by London University's Computing Services, and only then were the data in a form readable by Cambridge CAD centre's Atlas-2 computer, connected by teletype to Monks Wood (Harding & Sheail, 1992: 9) . Only later in the 1970s and 1980s did cheaper computing bring the data back under local control, the 'sheer size of the BRC [Biological Records Centre] dataset as a whole' being a problem. 18 The compelling message for us of the mechanization and computerization of botanical record collection is therefore as follows: while routinization might be an essential preliminary process, and will often accompany mechanization by punched-card machinery, computerization does not inevitably or immediately follow. When computerization did take place, the organization of botanical recording remained remarkably similar to that during mechanization. 19 Despite the fact that botany was a pioneer among the sciences in punched-card mechanization, it was not an early user of electronic
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Social Studies of Science 36/6 stored-program computers. To find those, we must turn our attention away from natural history and toward the analytical sciences.
Computerization of Government Knowledge Work
The administrative bodies of government are, and have been, generators, distributors, storers and processors of immense quantities of data. James C. Scott argues that states use acts of simplification to make legible what they intend to administer: they strip down social and natural complexities, making them quantifiable, object-like and certain (Scott, 1998 In that year, Harold Wilson's administration, well aware of how the modern lustre of computing reflected pre-election promises of 'white heat' technological revolutions, announced a further acceleration of the programme: up to 300 computers might be embedded in departments by 1975. The first 'guinea pigs', where government was experimenting with electronic computing, illustrate clearly two of the strategies of computerization: replicate the existing procedures of computation, and seize an opportunity for reorganization.
One form that knowledge about things took was economic statistics. The Board of Trade's Census of Production generated 'numbers of things', such as engines, tons of coal, vehicles, stocks in store and workers employed. Created in 1906, in the wake of Tariff Reform controversies, and based on a US model, the census was held irregularly until World War II, when the introduction of stronger government direction of the economy deepened and broadened production of statistical knowledge. This emphasis remained in the post-war Keynesian years, even after 1951 when strict Keynesianism was abandoned. Without 'exact quantitative information about current economic movements', noted the authors of the 1944 White Paper on Employment Policy, a seminal text for demand management, 'informed control would be impossible' and planners would be 'left to grope and flounder in uncertainty' (UK Government, 1944) . The Census of Production became an annual event from 1950. Data extracted from questionnaires, filled in by businesses, were processed by hand and by punched-card machine.
Agar: What Difference Did Computers Make? 879
In contrast to the annual Census of Production, the decennial Census of Population of England and Wales was a source of knowledge of people. Punched-card machinery had been deployed since 1911, and while 1951 was (just barely) too early for the architects of the census to consider the application of stored-program electronic computers, 1961 gave plenty of time to prepare and plan. The two censuses, of Production and of Population, shared an important pattern in the transfer from punched-card to computerized data processing: the human work of machine-minding the punched-card machines was reduced to explicitly expressed procedures. These were 'programmes'. 20 Figure 1 is an extract of the instructions given to punched-card operators for the 1951 Census of Population. 21 In this way generalist civil servants sought to specify the actions of the human operators of punched-card machines. What is immediately apparent is how similar these instructions, this 'programme', are to a computer program. Numbers are moved from place to place. Statements of the form 'When . . . do . . .' become 'if . . . then' lines of code. Indeed the computerization of the censuses of population and production took this form: of a transfer from programmes of human operator action to programs of
FIGURE 1 Extract from instructions given to punched-card operators for the 1951 Census of Population
Lower the Gang Punch levers on Columns 3 to 11 and 25 to 27; set skip stops on Columns 28, 36, 38, 39, 54, 46 and 63. Card columns 3-6
Punch the Registration District number in Columns 3 to 5 and Sub-District number in Column 6 . . . . Where the Sub-District number is ten or more, over punch V and the units figure. Check that the Number is unchanged when commencing each fresh form, revising the setting where necessary.
7-11
Punch the Area Code shown on the front cover of the volume. If several codes are shown begin with the first one; a blank sheet will be inserted to indicate the change of code and that re-setting is necessary. Set the margin stop to begin at Column 25.
25-27
For The primary justification in both cases was 'speed'. But note that despite the starkly dehumanized description of action that the above programme takes, it still calls on human discretion: settings are ordered to be revised 'where necessary'. So -unless the computer was to stop and ask advice (which was the solution sometimes adopted) -the transfer from programme to program also worked to further remove moments of discretion. As the human hand was, apparently, lifted from the production of social facts, so the administrative users of the facts could claim the virtues of mechanical objectivity for themselves.
Elsewhere, in The Government Machine, I have argued that there were good reasons why certain civil servants recognized and promoted mechanization and computerization (Agar, 2003) . In the 19th century, the growth of government encouraged the employment of social groups within the civil service to whom gentlemanly trust could not, automatically, be extended. One consequence was the deepening of the mechanical metaphor, a useful fiction that cast the entire civil service as machine-like, and therefore reliable, directable and predictable in its action, and devoid of its own agency. However, the metaphor of the civil service-as-machine was appropriated and creatively reinterpreted by a middling class of civil servants, between the elite generalists and the lowly 'mechanicals', to use the language of the seminal Northcote-Trevelyan report. In particular, this middling group of executive officers reinterpreted the machine metaphor as a justification for a programme of mechanization, and built a successful, expert movement as a result. Governments, particularly the governments of late 19th and 20th centuries, have universal aspirations, in contrast to, say, private corporations, which have private and narrow interests. The civil service was cast as a general-purpose machine. Alan Turing's attack on the Entscheidungsproblem, which proceeds by considering the actions of mechanical and generalist civil servants, in thinly veiled form, and outlines the limits and possibilities of universal machines, can therefore be seen as an exploration of just such a general-purpose machine (Agar, 2003: 69-74) . In brief, in the 20th century there were good reasons for why the organizational form of the civil service and the technological form of the generalpurpose stored-program computer were analogous. And in the middling group of experts, who shifted fairly seamlessly from exponents of mechanization to computerization, there existed human agents primed to recognize and promote 'programmes' of work.
The cases of computerization of population and economic statistics show how an existing form of human-mechanical organization of computation could take a radically different format -a computer programwith little change in procedure. My next example shows how computerization could also be used to transform the organization of computation. The Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance was one of the giant administrative institutions of the British welfare state, its immense offices employing thousands, impacting on the social patterns of work around Newcastle in the north of England. Clerks, within a complex system of ledgers, files and dockets, recorded insurance contributions of nearly all the working population of the UK. Proposals in the early 1950s for the computerization of the Newcastle offices were among the very first in Britain. Yet it was not until late 1959 that a Leo II computer was installed. This was the start of successive computerizations that have not stopped. Rather than simply transfer programmes to programs, computerization enabled administrators to pursue a root-and-branch revision of work, in the name of savings (that is, sackings): the computer programs reflected, therefore, a reorganization of computation and a reordering of human organization. Technology went hand in hand with innovation in organization.
Computerization of knowledge work within government illustrates that the process could either reproduce or reorder existing organizations of data processing. The examples also show that computerization was part of changing relationships within departments, in particular between senior administrators (generalist civil servants) and clerks and operators of machines (collectively labelled 'mechanicals'). Elsewhere, I argue that this relationship between generalists and mechanicals was crucial to imagining the computer as a general-purpose machine (Agar, 2003) . But government knowledge work should also be seen as continuous with science. In the 1960s new objects of the human sciences -the 'whole person concept', in which a 'person' was constituted by combining perspectives from different statistical databases is a good example -would be created as part and parcel of further computerization (Agar, 2003: 355) . Unfortunately the documentary records are surprisingly sparse, so we will turn to the next case study to trace the relationship between new methods and the constitution of new scientific objects. We also turn from the human and social sciences to the physical sciences.
X-Ray Crystallography of Organic Molecules: Hodgkin at Oxford
Making X-ray crystallography work required the effective use of many resources.
22 X-rays scattered by a crystal were detected on a photographic plate. But the route from patterns on a photograph to the derivation of a crystal structure was non-trivial. The larger the molecule the more complex the pattern and the less tractable the calculations. Also, producing crystals of large organic molecules presented a formidable task in itself. For example, the Oxford-based Dorothy Hodgkin depended on academic and industrial contacts -with Alexander Todd at Cambridge University, and particularly with Lester Smith at Glaxo Laboratories -for supplies of valuable pure vitamin B 12 crystals.
Measurements of the direction and intensity of spots on X-ray diffraction photographs provided data, typically 'structure factors', F. While it was in principle possible to derive atomic co-ordinates in a (Patterson & Glusker, 1987) . Even armed with Patterson's function, the addition of cosines remained an arduous, repetitive task, and therefore prone to errors. Thus a second, calculational tool was devised by C. Arnold Beevers and H. Lipson, two physicists working in Bragg's laboratory at the University of Manchester. Every relevant sine and cosine function was pre-calculated and recorded on standard strips. 23 By placing these Beevers-Lipson strips alongside each other, it was possible to compose and read off any summation that was needed. Further strategies were also followed to simplify the calculation. A heavy atom in a crystal was easier to spot, so crystallographers often chose to work with organic molecules with heavy atoms present, often artificially introduced.
The process of crystal structure determination was iterative. A hypothetical structure was guessed and a predicted diffraction pattern compared with those photographed. In summary, an X-ray crystallographer working in the 1930s needed supplies of crystals, machines to produce X-rays and record diffraction patterns, knowledge and skill in computational methods, and experience in crystallography to facilitate the iterative process of structure determination. Securing and maintaining the networks needed to secure these resources was the main task of a successful X-ray crystallographer. And the mechanization and computerization of X-ray crystallography only make sense in the context of these networks. The cases of Dorothy Hodgkin and John Kendrew illustrate how they proceeded. Dorothy Crowfoot was born in Cairo in 1910, and became Dorothy Hodgkin on her marriage in 1937 (Ferry, 1998) . Apart from 2 years spent in Cambridge with J.D. Bernal, she spent her working life as a crystallographer in Oxford. Her work focused on the structure of large organic molecules: from cholesterol iodide (the first organic molecule to be determined completely by X-ray crystallography) in the 1930s, to penicillin in the 1940s, to Nobel prize-winning determinations of the structure of vitamin B 12 in the post-war years. Her work on vitamin B 12 in the 1950s extensively used the first electronic stored-program computers. Hodgkin's wartime work on penicillin strengthened the networks through which she could secure computational tools and expertise, including Beevers-Lipson strips and punched-card techniques. 24 Of particular importance was the link forged between her Oxford centre and the private Scientific Computing Service Ltd (SCS) run by Leslie J. Comrie, an astronomer and pioneer in mechanical computation using punched-card methods (Croarken, 1990) .
The service offered by SCS included expertise in computational methods and installations of punched-card equipment at a scale and price that would otherwise be beyond the means of individual academic departments. Indeed, the working relationship between Oxford and SCS depended on the exchange of ideas. For example, in 1944, with the X-ray crystallography of penicillin being urgently pursued, H.O. Hartley of SCS wrote to Hodgkin regarding Hollerith punched-card methods:
I am enclosing a note on a method of direct approach as an alternative to the three-dimensional Fourier synthesis method. This is really the outcome of a suggestion which . . . you put to [SCS] viz. That a more direct method of solution of the original equations should be tried to see how it compares with the amount of labour involved in the Fourier synthesis. 25 The note spelled out the use of punched cards for Hodgkin's X-ray crystallography. Such techniques had already been successfully introduced in the USA, in particular by Linus Pauling at the California Institute of Technology (Caltech). Hollerith methods had been discussed in Britain in the 1930s, for example at Sir Lawrence Bragg's laboratory in Manchester, but were new for Hodgkin's team. Adoption was not unproblematic. 'What is suitable for crystallographers in the early stages', noted Hartley, was 'different from what is needed by a computing establishment later on.' He suggested a careful division of labour, in which the more routine aspects of the procedure were separated from those that depended upon expertise. While the method 'could only be worked in the initial stages if it were periodically referred to a crystallographer, the final stages . . . are quite workable [by punched-card techniques] and probably shorter than Fourier synthesis'. 26 To the crystallographers this arrangement had the advantage of retaining control over the computational procedure, at least in the early stages. For SCS the association was beneficial, since the prestigious name of Oxford University would later be used to drum up commercial trade.
SCS made plain that what punched-card techniques offered the X-ray crystallographers was speed. So, for example, Comrie, in his summary of advantages, emphasized that 'the effect of the new process is that crystallographic research can be speeded up'. But some of the gains in speed could be traded for improvements in accuracy: finer detail was resolved with higher frequencies of X-rays, which in turn called for more calculations (since the crystal was being examined at a larger number of grid-points), which would have taken longer without punched-cards. Quantitative improvements in speed of calculation could trigger qualitative shifts in research programmes. New problems could be solved: 'three-dimensional syntheses', noted Comrie, 'need no longer be shirked '. 27 So what changed with the introduction of mechanical calculation to Hodgkin's programme of X-ray crystallography of organic molecules? At one level, nothing: the method was 'not new, being that of the well-known Beevers-Lipson strips . . . punched on to Hollerith card'. 28 So while the means of calculation changed, the method remained essentially the same. But the punched cards did offer 'speed, the elimination of drudgery, and accuracy', or rather a strategic trade-off between the three. And these advantages permitted radical new choices within the research programme, in particular the analysis and re-construction of three-dimensional structures, rather than mere two-dimensional slices through the molecule. But also, since Hodgkin was turning to new techniques that were expensive, and in which she herself was not proficient, the adoption of mechanical calculation came with a division of labour. In this relationship 'the physicist can devote himself to observation and the early stages of the subsequent analysis, where his knowledge and intuition are essential. As soon as voluminous routine calculations are reached, he can turn to the Hollerith for relief'. 29 This bifurcation would eventually lead to distinct professional roles for data managers within the process of laboratory work.
Unlike the case of mechanical botany, Hodgkin soon transferred the means of calculation from punched-card techniques to electronic computing. Oddly, this was partially because of lack of resources. In the USA, Linus Pauling had called on the substantial support of the Rockefeller Foundation to fund the application of punched-card techniques to structural chemistry. He bought in professional mechanical computing services, employed specially trained operators, and secured exclusive use of expensive equipment (Cox et al., 1947) . 30 Repetitive synthesis computations, of the same type deployed in Britain, were black-boxed in the form of sets of punched cards. The experiment with punched cards with SCS demonstrated the advantages achievable in speed, organization, and accuracy, but in her new project on the three-dimensional structure of vitamin B 12 , Hodgkin had to make choices. One option was further investment in punched cards. However, contingently, relations with SCS dwindled after 1945, partly because the company's mainstay, Comrie, suffered a stroke (misdiagnosed for several months), and also because the Oxford group could not offer regular, paid work that would make it an indispensable customer to SCS. Crucially, too, while Hodgkin was confident that Pauling would donate a set of repetitive synthesis punched cards, she did not command the funds that would secure the computing services, operators and equipment employed by the US chemist. 31 While some punched-card equipment could be begged from the manufacturer British Tabulating Machines (BTM), as well as time on the installation at the National Physical Laboratory, they were not sufficient. So she turned to a new invention, the electronic computer.
In 1950 there was a handful of working electronic computers in the world. They were of two distinct kinds. The first were digital, storedprogram general-purpose machines, many following the design outlined in the First Draft of a Report on the EDVAC (1945). They included Eckert and Mauchly's Univac, which was being built at the US Bureau of Census (completed in 1951), the experimental device in operation at the University of Manchester (from 1948), and the EDSAC at Cambridge (from 1949) (Stern, 1981) . The second were analogue: special-purpose machines that could pick from a menu of calculational methods. Compared with the early digital machines, analogue computers were faster, more narrowly constrained in function, less accurate, and embedded in the culture of the engineering workshop rather than the scientists' laboratory (Small, 2001 ). In 1950, Hodgkin heard of an analogue computer dedicated to X-ray crystallographic computation.
The Office of Naval Research and the Auburn Research Foundation had funded Ray Pepinsky to build the X-RAC, an analogue computer that automated much of the process of two-dimensional Patterson synthesis, producing electron density maps on a cathode-ray tube display. Originally built in Alabama, the machine travelled with Pepinsky when he took up a new position in the Department of Physics at Penn State University. The X-RAC took a little while to settle: 'the blasted machine', Pepinsky exclaimed, 'we never cease building it'. 32 Once the machine was working, Pepinsky offered time on it to Hodgkin. His motives were fourfold. He regarded Hodgkin as a friend, a link that had been strengthened when she had sent one of her co-workers to assist him on a temporary basis. Second, providing a computing service placated Pepinsky's paymasters. 'This computational help', he wrote to Hodgkin, was 'just what we promised the ONR [Office of Naval Research] we would provide . . . in return for the support we obtained in the development of the X-RAC. We would like to be able to report successful applications of the machine privately to the ONR'. 33 Third, credit would be gained through publication of results, although Pepinsky was at pains to emphasize that such actions should not be interpreted as attempts to '"horn in" on the problems [Hodgkin had] brought here solely for computing'. In other words, by assuming a secondary place in the division of labour, Pepinsky was free to circulate some of the results arising from the vitamin B 12 work to gain credit. Finally, collaboration with Hodgkin enabled Pepinsky to take petty revenge. He had felt slighted when a few years earlier another crystallographer, working like Hodgkin on vitamin B 12 , had 'spurned and pooh-poohed' a request for a handful of crystals. By helping Hodgkin, Pepinsky was delivering a blow to her rival, Karl Folkers at Merck and Co. Inc. 34 The use of Pepinsky's X-RAC followed the pattern of relationships between scientists and computing services established earlier with Hodgkin and SCS. It was also (apart from investment of the time of a visiting researcher) free, which helped. But the peculiar strengths and weaknesses of analogue computing placed restrictions on the use of the X-RAC. While it was particularly effective for 'tactical use in the early and intermediate stages of an investigation', as an interactive tool that provided quick visual representations of a crystal structure, the analogue X-RAC could not match the accuracy of digital methods (Bunn, 1950) . (Analogue computing did not offer the same potential to trade between speed and accuracy available through digital computing.) So Hodgkin sought out electronic digital computers. Again robust social relationships were essential to her success. One computer, the Pilot ACE, was at the National Physical Laboratory, where Hodgkin had had some success in securing punched-card time. But the NPL was unenthusiastic (regarding work on vitamins as considerably less of a priority than the earlier work on penicillin). She had better luck with two other teams. Professor E. Gordon Cox at the Department of Chemistry University of Leeds was an old, if rather formal, friend of Hodgkin's (they began addressing each other by first names 20 years after they first corresponded). Cox led a group with an international reputation in the computational aspects of crystallography, and which had become one of the first users of the Ferranti Mark I computer at Manchester University when it became available to outside users in 1951. Cox's group already possessed punched-card routines for three-dimensional syntheses, and while being 'careful about swapping horses in mid-stream', he was keen to investigate electronic computing methods. Again there was a division of labour: the Leeds team offered to do calculations, modifying and improving their own programs, which were suited to structures with relatively few atoms, in order to adapt them for Hodgkin's large organic molecules. 35 Cox's colleague, D.W.J. Cruikshank, for example, soon made improvements that led to a 30% increase in speed of structure factor calculations (Ahmed & Cruikshank, 1953) . The method, importantly, still derived from the Patterson synthesis and the Beevers-Lipson strip approach. Leeds benefited through the mechanisms of academic credit (for example, production of publications) as well as financially (Manchester charged £5 per hour, a discount rate, which Oxford had to pay).
By 1954, the Oxford group was able to publish a paper in Nature on preliminary results (Brink et al., 1954) . One of the co-authors, John White, was a collaborator at the Frick Laboratory, Princeton. The paper described the rough three-dimensional shapes of four crystals (air-dried vitamin B 12 , vitamin B 12 'in its mother liquor', B 12 with an added selenium atom, and a 'red degradation product of vitamin B 12 '). At this stage only an outline and the positions of the heavy atoms (cobalt, selenium), and some lighter atoms near them, were known with certainty. To the authors the most remarkable aspect was 'strong evidence for the existence of a new type of ring system'. However, the paper also served as a marker and as confirmation of the power of digital electronic computation: 'we now have little doubt that a complete solution of the crystal structure by X-ray analysis is possible'.
Getting to a 'complete solution' required one more set of relationships to be built, which gave Hodgkin access to a very powerful and, crucially, very cheap computer. Although Ken Trueblood worked at the Department of Chemistry at the University of California, Los Angeles, he was allowed to use a fast experimental digital computer being built on campus for the National Bureau of Standards. The SWAC (Standards Western Automatic Computer) was a parallel machine, an unusual architecture that departed from the EDVAC pattern. Like the Manchester machine, it was completed earlier than many other computers because its designer had chosen the 36 Happily, like SCS and to a lesser extent Cox's group, Trueblood was content to focus on computational aspects. UCLA was relatively poorly equipped for X-ray crystallography, but rich in computational resources, while Oxford was the reverse. 37 Trueblood and Hodgkin could trade. Hodgkin had known of Trueblood's access to SWAC in 1953, when the arrangement with Leeds was making good progress. The following year, as it was becoming clear what scale of computational resources would be needed to complete vitamin B 12 , she wrote warmly to Trueblood:
Now first would you like to -and can you -continue these B 12 fragment calculations with us? It seems to us that a very remarkable situation is developing -the whole structure of a large molecule, chemically unknown, coming out of X-ray analysis. And the existence of you and the SWAC quite changes our ideas of what we can do in the way of finding and making sure of this structure. 38 Again 'what we can do' was part of an economy of time, speed and accuracy. Cruickshank estimated that the relatively few hours on the SWAC would have taken 500 hours on the Manchester machine. 39 SWAC was faster, which meant more computations per second, which, in turn, meant that larger molecules could be attacked or the same molecules with greater accuracy. And SWAC was free. The algorithm, a numerical methods representation of the Patterson synthesis, remained the same from Beevers-Lipson strips, to punched cards and to electronic computers. But the use of punched-card machines was 'equivalent to adding 10,000 to 16,000 Beevers strips per day'; electronic computers increased this advantage ratio to hundreds of thousands (Ferranti Mark I) and millions (SWAC). 40 And through this quantitative change, qualitative shifts in research strategy were made feasible in relation to other constraints: the structure of larger molecules with three, not two, dimensions, arrived at before rivals. Hodgkin explicitly addressed speed when she wrote that without the SWAC the vitamin B 12 calculations would have progressed in a 'pedestrian way'. 41 Yet without the SWAC, by the time Hodgkin's team had arrived at their destination, a complete structure of vitamin B 12 , another group -such as the one at Merck -would have got there first. No wonder the social relationships that enabled access to early electronic computers were so carefully built.
X-Ray Crystallography of Organic Molecules: Kendrew at Cambridge
Turning from Oxford to Cambridge, we find another group applying the first electronic computers to the derivation of structures of large organic molecules. The work of John Kendrew, and colleagues, confirms the In general, in our crystallographic work, it is most satisfactory for the crystallographer to do his programming, since he is probably developing methods as he goes along, and he alone understands precisely the problem needing solution; besides, crystallographers usually have adequate training in mathematics and take to programming very rapidly. 42 It might be more accurate to say that control over programming could be released when advantageous. For example, Kendrew was also fortunate in that Maurice Wilkes' EDSAC team pioneered the systematic accumulation of computer sub-routines in early program libraries (Campbell-Kelly, 1980; Wilkes, 1985) . Efficient, compact and error-free code -albeit under someone else's control -was therefore available for some applications.
The most significant early link between the MRC unit and the Mathematical Laboratory was Kendrew's collaboration with John M. Bennett, Wilkes' first research student. Bennett wrote programs to perform Patterson syntheses, first in two dimensions and then in three, work which resulted in an influential publication in Acta Crystallographica in 1952 (Bennett & Kendrew, 1952) . Much of his effort was devoted to economizing program length and data handling, essential given the small stores of early computers. This constraint pushed the Cambridge group into generating quick low-accuracy maps rather than machine-intensive precise calculations -an advantage in rapidly mapping a large molecule of unknown shape. Like Hodgkin, the method chosen was a direct analogue of earlier computational methods: Beevers-Lipson strips translated into code, and 10 times faster than similar Hollerith schemes. 43 Bennett also temporarily located in Manchester, and, after acclimatizing to the 'atmosphere of perpetual gloom which pervades [that] part of the world', was able to compare the Ferranti Mark I with the EDSAC. In November 1950, Bennett had reported to Kendrew that the Leeds crystallographers, collaborators with Hodgkin and experts in computation, regarded the Cambridge duo as 'rank amateurs'. But by July 1951, their experience of both EDSAC and the Manchester machine had given them a sufficiently high profile to speak at the inaugural conference of the Ferranti Mark I, the only crystallographers to do so. 44 Their approach was as follows. Heavy atoms introduced into the protein could be identified and analysed -along with the neighbouring structureby two-dimensional Patterson syntheses. The resolution was 0.6 nm (6 Å), generating 400 reflections as data, calculations tractable by EDSAC. The National Physical Laboratory's DEUCE checked the myoglobin syntheses by re-calculating the EDSAC results. This computerized process generated tables of numbers, a grid that was then skewed to the correct proportions of the crystal unit cell by an anisograph -a simple analogue device imported from the Admiralty Signals Research Establishment. 45 The new tables were used to construct models of the protein shape and structure, which are considered further below. Digital computing only entered part, though an important part, of the determination of myoglobin structure, which was first announced in Nature in 1958 (Kendrew et al., 1958) .
To refine the crude structure, Kendrew's team moved to higher frequencies of X-rays, giving higher resolutions, but also massively increasing the computational task: 0.15 nm (1.5 Å) -enough to resolve individual atoms -required 20,000 reflection measurements for each heavy atom. This meant 800 hours on the EDSAC II, the faster successor to the first machine, alongside 1000 hours for Perutz's haemoglobin analysis. A second paper in Nature followed, written with collaborators at the Davy Faraday Research Laboratory of the Royal Institution (Kendrew et al., 1960) . Furthermore, the computers in Cambridge were troublesome. By 1960 Kendrew was complaining: 'in the final stage we are about to begin . . . it is clear that EDSAC II is not fast enough, nor does it have adequate storage capacity'. 46 The troubled construction of the unreliable Titan (a variant of the Manchester University/Ferranti Atlas) was to be of no help. Like Hodgkin, Kendrew now had to seek out extra-mural high-speed computers with time to spare. However, he could preserve the advantage of the EDSAC sub-routine libraries by looking to IBM machines, for which FORTRAN programs could be accumulated and translated from machine to machine. Institutions that responded sympathetically included the UK's Atomic Weapons Research Laboratory (which hired an IBM Stretch), Los Alamos (also a Stretch) and Imperial College (an IBM 7090, on order), although much work was done at the commercial IBM London Data Centre. Aside from being expensive, extra-mural contracts were against Kendrew's instinct of controlling computing locally. A measure of
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Social Studies of Science 36/6 such local control was not regained until the mid-1960s, when the molecular biologists bought blocks of time on the IBM 260/44 at Fred Hoyle's Institute of Theoretical Astronomy. Kendrew's concern for control distinguishes his research style from Hodgkin's, and also points towards significant further developments. The Cambridge crystallographer began to recast his science as one dominated by the problems of information management and digital data manipulation. 47 This commitment worked on several levels. For example, at an information management level, in a 'borderline field' such as the emerging molecular biology, wrote Kendrew, 'the ideal (an impossible one) is to be acquainted with all of biochemistry and a good deal of physics and a good deal of chemistry and a good deal of biology'. 48 In 1947 the only solution to this 'acute' problem on the horizon was a 'comprehensive indexing system'. 49 He was much taken with Vannevar Bush's proposed memex machine, an automated hypertextual library, and saw molecular biology as reliant upon, and even defined by, such information management.
At the level of data manipulation, Kendrew's aim was to automate. The grid of numbers generated directly by EDSAC -for example the sperm whale myoglobin reproduced in Bennett and Kendrew's 1952 paper -may seem a striking digital representation of a scientific object. 50 However, they are identical in form to those produced by hand after arduous repetitive calculation. It is significant that they do not appear in subsequent publications, because by then further stages in the process of X-ray crystallography at Cambridge had been automated. The EDSAC '"cell dimensions" in the machine plot' had been set by the 'space and shift distances of the teleprinter', before being, as noted above, skewed to correct proportions by an analogue device, the anisograph (Bennett & Kendrew, 1952: 116) . Later, however, the process from recording crystal reflections to output of three-dimensional structure would be mediated automatically by digital techniques only. Some of this ideal was captured in 1959, when Kendrew wrote:
. . . now that the magnetic tape is coming into full operation, and in addition our data handling problems are becoming much more complicated, we badly feel the need of more expert programming . . . We are developing automatic Geiger counter spectrometer equipment for measuring X-ray reflexions, whose setting would be controlled by tape produced by EDSAC, and whose output would also be on tape. Finally, we are considering the addition to EDSAC of a new high-resolution CRT output which would plot contours of electron density. 51 Automatic diffractometers providing data for automatic calculation, followed by automatic representation, comprised Kendrew's 'hopeful plans for the automation of protein crystallography'. 52 There was no mention of the teams of women doing routinized calculations that such automation would render redundant. This commitment to automation was held despite acute problems in practice: the Ferranti automatic diffractometers controlled by an Argus computer, for example, were notoriously unreliable. The commitment to automation has many candidate explanations: a familiar attempt to claim the virtues of mechanical objectivity through the removal of human operators (cf. Daston & Galison, 1992) , a manoeuvre within the economy of speed and accuracy, a part of the wider redefinition in terms of information of the life sciences, particularly molecular biology (cf. Kay, 1995; Keller, 1995) , or an aspect of a 'Great Transformation' more generally (Mirowski, 2002: 159) .
New Models? Two Possible Counterexamples: Monte Carlo and Interactive Molecular Graphics
In the cases discussed so far, computerization has been congruent with pre-existing manual and mechanical methods of computation. They have supported my general claim that this pattern was typical. Now I will turn to two candidate counterexamples. Monte Carlo simulation was both one of the very first uses of electronic stored-program computers and, apparently, a radically new method. Computerization and innovation in technique seem to have appeared, together, hand-in-hand. The second candidate counterexample is interactive molecular graphics, a means of representing three-dimensional structures of organic molecules on twodimensional screens in such a way that interaction -turning, manipulating, playing -was permitted. At first glance, such interaction seems like a startling new way of using computers in science. Both of these cases can be better assessed within a broader history of model-making and model-using in the sciences. When Trueblood plotted peaks of electron density for Hodgkin he 'saw' atoms. When Kendrew glanced at the output of EDSAC he 'saw' the shape of molecules. Lines on paper and grids of numbers were seen as scientific objects. This empirical finding supports Robertson's secondary argument about computers as new instruments of science (Robertson, 2003: 9) . Indeed, the representational practices whereby scientists perform this remarkable feat have been well researched by sociologists and historians. Even amongst our case studies, the practices have been very diverse, with computers taking, again, only one part of the process. De Chadarevian has recently shown how diverse and important were the model-building practices deployed when X-ray crystallographers became molecular biologists (de Chadarevian, 2002: 136-60) . They inherited many of these practices from chemistry. One of the models from the 1940s can be seen in the Museum of the History of Science, Oxford. Hodgkin plotted electron density values, calculated after the laborious Beevers-Lipson method, and represented them as dark contours on a series of clear plastic sheets. When stacked and viewed, especially from above, the contours trick the eye into seeing three-dimensional structures. In this case, the stack represented part of a penicillin molecule. Hodgkin used similar methods when electronic computers were introduced.
The plastic stack method is limited by the opacity of the sheets. Great ingenuity went into devising other representational practices. Max Perutz built haemoglobin models with many-shaped plastic forms, in black and white. Kendrew's team represented myoglobin in plasticine, giving the molecule an alarmingly turd-like appearance on publication in Nature. Models built of rods, or rods and balls, possessed greater gravitas, and de Chadarevian demonstrates how these striking and movable objects became highly visible icons of the new science in museums, world fairs and television programmes in the 1950s and 1960s. The point to emphasize here is that electronic computers were merely one part in a process of molecular model-making.
Galison, in his analysis of microphysics, Image and Logic (1997) , offers a different perspective on computers and models. Computers play two important roles in his account: as substitutes for human labour and as substitutes for nature. While he is describing high-energy physics, Galison's examples of computers being used to replace human work closely parallel my case studies above. However, his rich account of this application suggests further interpretation, so before returning to models, I will summarize and compare his story. Galison finds two traditions at work in 20th-century microphysics: an image tradition in which picturing techniques, mimetic representations and 'golden events' were valued; and a logic tradition in which counting techniques, homologous representations and statistical interpretation of many events were valued instead (Galison, 1997: 19) : cloud chambers versus Geiger-Muller counters; picturing versus counting; and, to an extent (although not in his words), analogue versus digital (see also Gooding, 1999: 363) . As the scale of physics increased after the 1940s, both traditions embraced the computer as a means of reorganizing work, but in different ways.
With the growth in scale and teamwork, high-energy physics was marked by the 'removal of the physicist from the apparatus, the specialization of tasks, the increased role of computation, and the establishment of hierarchical collaborations' (Galison, 1997: 318) . The question was: what particular role would the machines of computation play? At Berkeley, Luis Alvarez, placed in the image tradition, insisted that humans still had a crucial role to play. 'Judgement was required' in scanning work, for example, since, while the work was routinized, it was 'not an algorithmic activity, an assembly line procedure in which action could be specified fully by rules'. The computer joined the 'scanning girl' and physicist to make 'the system, not a prelude to it' (Galison, 1997: 380-83) . This attitude was similar to Hodgkin's. However, others, such as CERN's Leo Kowarski, also placed in the image tradition, championed automation as keenly as Kendrew: human intervention in data extraction would be confined to preparatory work (Galison, 1997: 371-85) . Going further still along this path were the physicists Galison allots to the logic tradition, who had reluctantly supplemented counting with the visual apparatus of photography and bubble chambers in the 1920s and 1930s, and now felt a yearning for a 'return to the purity and control of circuits and counters', which attracted them immediately to the computer. Whereas within the image tradition 'computer programming defined the experiment through data extraction, in the logic tradition programming entered into all phases of data production -from the design of the apparatus to the recording of results ' (1997: 491-92) . Such visions of automation unsettled some physicists, who feared that they would become mere sifters of archives. Was the physicist, they worried, to become a mere machine-minder? At Berkeley the computer was an aid, at CERN it was an ideal. In Berkeley the computer was an equal partner in the process (except in matters of authorship, where humans were privileged). 53 At CERN the computer was the process. At both Berkeley and CERN similar factors were felt pushing such computerization: increased scale of data and the value of eliminating humans in the face of 'uncertainties in the labor market'. 54 As the high-energy physics laboratory became more like a factory, so computerization became one strategy in the politics of the workplace.
For Galison, the computer becomes a catalyst as the two traditions react and merge from the late 1960s. The instrument that symbolized this merger was the Mark 1, also known as the SLAC-SBL Solenoidal Magnetic Detector, on which the values of both traditions can be seen inscribed, and which was the prototype for high-energy colliding beam machines for many decades (Galison, 1997: 532) . Computing mediatestranslates -between the components (human and mechanical) of the Detector. In this role, what started as an interpretation of the computer as a replacement for human labour becomes reinterpreted as matters of 'language ' (1997: 525) . Oddly, then, the social importance that Galison awards to the computer is therefore primarily linguistic, which accords with his methodological tastes.
Galison's second role for the computer is as a 'stand-in for nature ' (1997: 44) , and his development of this argument offers a candidate counterexample to mine. 55 Developing the atomic bomb raised critical questions, such as how much energy would be released effectively, which could be only poorly investigated by direct experiment or by theory. Detonating bombs made for dangerous experiments, and the equations of theory could not be given analytic solutions. For the thermonuclear bomb, John von Neumann and Stanislaw Ulam offered instead an artificial version: simulation by numerical methods, named 'Monte Carlo' by their collaborator, Nicholas Metropolis.
Let's pay careful attention to the language of necessity, tractability and feasibility. 'Experiment could not probe the critical mass with sufficient detail; theory led rapidly to unsolvable integro-differential equations', notes Galison (1996: 120) , 'the artificial reality of the Monte Carlo was the only solution'. Furthermore, where 'theory and experiment failed, some kind of numerical modelling was necessary, and here nothing could replace the prototype computer just coming into operation in late 1945: the ENIAC' (Galison, 1996: 122) . Some ideas were tried out using the ENIAC in 1945-46, and in 1948-49 when, perhaps significantly, the ENIAC had been converted to a limited stored-program machine (Anderson, 1986: 100) . But Monte Carlo applications soon became the preserve of fully fledged electronic stored-program computers, such as the SEAC and, especially, the MANIAC at Los Alamos. Galison argues that these simulations shared aspects of experiment and theory (he approves of Ulam's description: these 'experiments will of course be performed not with any physical apparatus, but theoretically'), but more importantly, strictly speaking, they were neither, instead forming a third way between them (Galison, 1997: 701) . Especially after Monte Carlo was partially declassified from 1949, simulations began to be used in diverse ways: as means of choosing between models, as phenomena in themselves, as tools for distinguishing between signal and noise, in the design of detectors and interpretation of theory (such as quantum chromodynamics [QCD]), and as stand-ins for reality. By the 1960s, life scientists also could, with good reason, discuss Monte Carlo simulations as straightforward experiments (Dietrich, 1996: 347) .
Given their strategic Cold War applications, simulations encouraged increased computing power, which in turn drove 'the exercise of ever more complex simulations' (Galison, 1997: 771) . Within this story, simulations become the dominant model-building practice, sidelining the diverse repertoire we saw in the case of the X-ray crystallographers. The computer becomes an instrument whose use and meaning can be described neatly in phases: 'the computer began as a "tool", an object for the manipulation of machines, objects and equations. But bit by bit (byte by byte), computer designers deconstructed the notion of a tool itself as the computer came to stand not for a tool, but for nature' (Galison, 1996: 156-57; 1997: 777) .
For Galison, computers, as simulators, made an immense difference to science. At the extreme, shared computer-dependent skills, such as Monte Carlo, gave the post-war sciences some measure of unified order. Possession of such skills made a 'chaotic assemblage of disciplines and activities: thermonuclear weapons, enhanced A-bombs, poison gas, weather prediction, pion-nucleon interactions, number theory, probability theory, industrial chemistry, and quantum mechanics' traversible by scientists such as John von Neumann (Galison, 1996: 119) . Overall, this was a 'new mode of producing scientific knowledge that was rich enough to coordinate highly diverse subject matter'. The differences did not stop there. New jobs were created (such as data analysis specialists in particle physics). The computer-enabled physicist developed new time relationships, in three ways:
[First] the computer expanded the timescale of events -often 10-31 seconds -to the scale of minutes, hours, and days -to the scale of minutes, hours, and days in which we live. Second, the time became repeatable as physicists reprocessed the same set of events in everdifferent ways to reveal different patterns of order. Finally, the computer allowed the physicists to break the ties between the accelerator 'beamtime' and their own time, time to live the lives of university-based scholars with teaching and departmental and familial duties. (Galison, 1996: 141) Some physicists embraced simulation precisely because it was 'alternative to coping with the harsh edges of the everyday', not least with direct confrontation with the consequences of some of their work: the bringing into existence of weapons of immense destructive power (Galison, 1996: 153-54) . Others claimed that Monte Carlo, with its reliance on random sampling, was superior because it aped the metaphysics of nature. Yet others were deeply hostile to Monte Carlo. Indeed, Galison's (1996) argument can be summarized as saying that without the capacity of Monte Carlo to coordinate -in a way akin to pidgin or, later, creole languagesthe method would not have withstood such hostility. I think Galison's argument on what differences Monte Carlo made to science is sustainable, but I do not think they translate unproblematically into the differences computers made to science. Two strands of evidence will suffice. First, Monte Carlo-like methods were not co-invented with the stored-program computer. Emilio Segrè recounted that his hero Enrico Fermi deployed hand-calculated Monte Carlo-style methods in his repertoire of calculational tricks from 1930s, both before his move to, and during his residence in, US nuclear projects (Segrè, 1965; Anderson, 1986) . The evidence is anecdotal, and perhaps it is an example of the wellrecognized genealogical strategy of domesticating upheavals in scientific practice by tracing them back to famous ancestors. Nevertheless, it may help loosen the connection between Monte Carlo and the first storedprogram computers. Second, as Galison himself indirectly demonstrates, alternative manual and mechanical methods were to hand. Von Neumann devoted considerable effort to a time-economy calculation, comparing the various methods (Galison, 1996) . He would not have done so if he had been sure that Monte Carlo was only feasible with a stored-program computer.
So the question of whether computerization only took place where material practices of computation already were available, I think remains empirically open. Francoeur has recently described a case that may be a counterexample: the development of interactive molecular graphics at MIT in the mid-1960s (Francoeur, 2002; Francoeur & Segal, 2004) . At MIT, privileged users could access the Electronic Systems Laboratory Display Console, known as the 'Kluge', a means of displaying, rotating and interacting with three-dimensional objects represented on screen, via the unique time-sharing system, Project MAC. Cyrus Levinthal, a biophysicist, used the Kluge to represent and interact with protein models. In some significant ways, Levinthal's science shows precisely the features that I have highlighted in this paper. First, the practices of computation were already in place: only the final stage -representation of the object -was transferred to a new medium. Second, while the existing techniques were still capable of the task at hand, a plausible claim could be sustained that they were straining at their limits: space-filling models of proteins built with rods, wires and plastic sagged due to their weight (Francoeur, 2002: 128; Francoeur & Segal, 2004: 411) .
However, Francoeur argues that what was new was the interactivity: 'the user was able not only to witness but also, through the display, to interact with the computations, and if necessary to control, correct and tweak them' (Francoeur, 2002: 129) . Computers made a difference: 'computer simulations of molecular structures . . . allowed a more complex representation of the forces at play within molecules' (Francoeur & Segal, 2004: 412) , while [molecular graphics] did not just insert itself into existing practices, it also transformed them, opening up opportunities for old questions to be answered in a different way, raising the possibility of asking new questions by combining the analytical power of the computer with the 'insights' provided by the visual display . . . In short it allowed scientists to do things differently. (Francoeur & Segal, 2004: 421-24) .
There is no doubt that a new speciality was built as the science of this interaction -interactive molecular graphics -although it seems to have been sustained by patrons who saw it as a means of pushing at the limits of graphics technology rather than of molecular biology. One way of interpreting this novelty would be to say that one difference computers made to science was to provide an active, interventionist means of 'seeing', that had roots in the practices through which scientists such as the X-ray crystallographers 'saw' atoms. Furthermore, it institutionalized the moment when the techniques of representation became complex enough for experts to stake out new disciplinary boundaries around that vision. On the other hand, the ways that Levinthal, and those that followed him, 'interacted with computations', to use Francoeur's terms, may well have had considerable continuity with modelling before computers. 56 Indeed, even in Francoeur and Segal's study, the computer-enabled models only supplement, rather than completely displace, traditional modelling techniques (Francoeur & Segal, 2004: 413) . Either way, further study is needed of scientific disciplines that formed around claims to computing expertise.
What Have the Examples Shown Us?
What generalizations can we extract from the detail of the case studies? Let us start with what the cases tell us about how computerization was achieved, which will then lead on to conclusions about what differences the computer made. First, it is clear that social networks -between objects, machines and humans -matter in computerization. Access to computing resources depended on who one knew. Furthermore, computers were only part of a long trail in which rare resources needed to be sourced. (Kendrew, for example, had a trail that started with finding a source of sperm whale myoglobin -not something bought off the shelf.) Second, computerization followed routinization of computation. Examples were the Beevers-Lipson strips of X-ray crystallography and the punched-card machinery of the Census of Population of England and Wales. However, the case of mechanical botany demonstrates that early computerization did not inevitably follow. Where it did happen, the process could be satirized as follows: machine-minded', other sciences, it was hoped, would be accelerated.
)
Levinthal's 'ultimate goal', write Francoeur and Segal of interactive molecular graphics, 'was not to replace X-ray crystallography, but to make possible the determination of protein structures with less expensive, less time-consuming low-resolution data' (Francoeur & Segal, 2004: 416) . Economies of time -to be quicker than rivals to results, to barter or buy time on machines, to increase the time a researcher could devote to other work -were paramount.
The question of whether computerization only took place in the context of pre-existing material practices of computation, I think, is open to further empirical research. I examined at some length the candidate counterexamples in the work of Galison and Francoeur. I agreed that Monte Carlo may well have made an immense difference to science, but suggested that the difference could not be pinned to the presence of stored-program computers. Interactive molecular graphics was indeed 'a new, exciting way of looking at macromolecular structures', but the novelty lay precisely in interactive 'new ways of looking' rather than in computation. There is empirical support for Robertson's notion that computers, as instruments, transformed what it meant for scientists 'to see', although I reject his main argument that the introduction of computers created a rupture, a 'phase change', in science. This is because claims of intractability, unfeasibility and especially impossibility should not be accepted at face values. These rhetorical strategies were used before the computer came on the scene, as well as during and after computerization.
Nevertheless, computerization coincided with qualitative shifts in what scientists were able to do. The transition from two-to three-dimensional syntheses of proteins was one example I discussed at length. Likewise, in physics, the astronomer Fred Hoyle reflected on the phenomenon in a curious policy intervention in 1957. Simplifying considerably, Hoyle argued that physics problems could be divided into those that could be solved analytically and those that required approximation via numerical methods. Of the latter, physics problems with one independent variable could be solved by hand or by mechanical methods; two required the 'fastest modern computers' and four or more required 'machines of the more or less distant future'. 59 Therefore, for Hoyle, the fate of physics hinged on the further advance of computers:
. . . unless computers of steadily increasing power are developed, physics will for ever remain ignorant of the precise solution of such problems: indeed physics will remain no more than a collection of special problems in which some severe restriction or fortunate accident allows the functions in question to be evaluated by mathematical (as opposed to numerical) analysis -[It] seems as if access to the full generality of physics will only come through the development of computers.
At face value, Hoyle's argument looks like a claim that qualitative change (specifically, the ability of physicists to handle all equations with more than one independent variable; generally, the limits of physics as a whole) was hitched to computerization. But again, once the context is examined in more detail, including Hoyle's specific concerns about access to computing power in his local university, the situatedness of his claim becomes apparent. The coincidence of qualitative shifts in what scientists could do with computerization was a construct in which it was often in a scientist's interests to stress that some tasks were impossible without computers. Certainly, and this is my fifth concluding point, all the examples show that scientists had various dependencies on experts in computation. The crucial adaptation of punched-card machinery to produce botanical maps followed a suggestion of a Powers-Samas engineer. Hodgkin's relationship with Comrie was interactive and creative, but she also depended on services rendered by Pepinsky and Trueblood. Kendrew aimed to minimize dependency on external expertise, keeping control over computing, but was not always successful. 'Data analysis' became an acceptable job description for a type of physicist. The point here is that one difference that computers made to science was deepening the division of labour -and expanding one side of the division, professional computing services. Such expertise would become institutionalized within laboratories and within new academic and corporate departments. Finally, especially in Kendrew's case there was a re-imagining and recombination of parts of the sciences into information sciences. In a wider perspective, this move was interconnected with the disciplinary selfawareness of computer science.
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TABLE 1

Number of independent variables
Computational possibilities 1 By hand in easy cases, or by hand machine. Otherwise, at least a 'slow' electronic computer is necessary 2 Except in very easy cases, the fastest modern computers are necessary 3
The easier cases already require computers envisaged for production in the early 1960s ≥ 4
Machines of the more or less distant future 
